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ABSTRACT. In this work I attempt a reformulation of Lewis’ Best System Account,
explicitating the underlying formal conception of scientific theories and trying to
define the concepts of simplicity, strength and balance. This essay is divided in
three sections. In the first one I introduce the Best System Account of natural
laws and formulate the need for its improvement. In the second section I outline
a formal framework where the notions of deductive system and scientific theory
can be defined precisely. In the last section the notions of simplicity, strength and
balance are analyzed. To conclude I argue that the framework proposed does indeed
provide the precision required. In addition, it also offers interesting insights on
the plurality of concepts of simplicity, strength and balance, and on the general
enterprise of formalizing scientific theories.
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1 The Best System Account
The Best System Account, BSA hereafter, is an attempt to answer the philosophical question:
“What are natural laws?”. The three philosophers associated with this perspective on natural
laws are J.S. Mill, F.P. Ramsey and D. Lewis, and for this reason BSA is also known as MRL
account. Let us introduce BSA quoting the locus classicus of the latter author. In his 1973
book Counterfactuals, Lewis characterized BSA in the following terms:
Whatever we may or may not ever come to know, there exist (as abstract objects) innumerable
true deductive systems: deductively closed, axiomatizable sets of true sentences. Of these
true deductive systems, some can be axiomatized more simply than others. Also, some of
them have more strength, or informational content, than others. The virtues of simplicity and
strength tend to conflict. Simplicity without strength can be had from pure logic, strength
without simplicity from (the deductive closure of) an almanac. [. . . ] What we value in a
deductive system is a properly balanced combination of simplicity and strength - as much of
both as truth and our way of balancing will permit. We can restate Ramsey’s 1928 theory of
lawhood as follows: a contingent generalization is a law of nature if and only if it appears as
a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that achieves a best combination
of simplicity and strength. (Lewis, 1973, p. 73, original italic)
We can immediately observe that Lewis reduces the problem of characterizing natural laws to
the problem of theory choice: once we have selected the best system(s) we can determine if
a statement is a natural law by checking if it is a theorem or an axiom of said system(s). It
is worthwhile to remark that this procedure will fail if the systems we are considering are
undecidable.
Lewis’ conception itself was not monolithic. It was articulated and slightly modified during
time in order to make it fit in Lewis’ own philosophy, e.g. with Principal Principle, modal
realism and natural properties.2 In what follows, however, I won’t analyze the development of
Lewis ideas through time. My aim is to discuss, and possibly clarify, the four core notions of
BSA, namely the notions of deductive system, simplicity, strength and balance. As can be seen
from the last quotation, for Lewis simplicity and strength are binary relations such that:
• a system is simpler than another one if it has a simpler axiomatization;
• a system is stronger than another one if it has more informational content.
From other textual evidences it seems that for Lewis, given a deductive system, the addition
of an assumption increases the strength and decreases the simplicity of the deductive system.
I therefore take the number of axioms (or hypotheses, as I will prefer to call them later) to be
the Lewisian measure of the symplicity of a deductive system.3
This characterization is insufficient, as I will argue in what follows. Indeed, the necessity
to pin down these concepts more precisely can be traced back to Lewis himself, as witnessed
by the following quotations:
In science we have standards - vague ones, to be sure - for assessing the combination of
strength and simplicity offered by deductive systems. (Lewis, 1973, pp. 73–74, emphasis
mine)
and
2See (Lewis, 1973, 1986, 1994, 1999).
3The correctness of this interpretation is however not essential for the aim of this paper, namely
providing an apt framework to specify the notions of simplicity, strength and balance.
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Of course, it remains an unsolved and difficult problem to say what simplicity of a formula-
tion is. (See the 1983 article “New work for a theory of universals”, reprinted in Lewis, 1999,
p. 42)4
In order to pursue the analysis of these notions I will stick to the 1973 formulation of BSA.
This is, to the best of my knowledge, faithful enough to the version of BSA that was received
in the literature on natural laws.5
1.1 The contemporary debate and the need for a more precise
version of BSA
The contemporary literature on BSA addresses a wide range of issues, essentially accepting
the 1973 formulation and its core notions. In general, we can identify roughly two attitudes
towards the explicit definitions of simplicity, strength and balance. On one hand, the issue is
ignored, in the sense that scholars rest content with Lewis’ characterization or simply decide
to postpone its analysis (among the others, the articles (Cohen and Callender, 2009), (Jaeger,
2002) and (Robert, 1999) are, in different degrees, examples of this perspective). On the other
hand, it is perceived as problematic (see for example (Psillos, 2002, p. 152); (Bird, 1998, p. 40);
(Armstrong, 1983, p. 67); (Mumford, 2004, p. 44)). The clearest exposition of this second stance
is Van Fraassen’s:
I have written here as if simplicity, strength and balance are as straightforward as a person’s
weight or height. Of course they are not, and the literature contains no account of them
which it would be fruitful to discuss here. [. . . ] To utilize these motions uncritically, as if they
dealt with such well-understood triads as ‘under five foot five, over 200 pounds, overweight’
may be unwarranted. (Van Fraassen, 1989, pp. 41–42)
I agree with this concern and I take the insufficient precision of such notions as a drawback of
BSA. The following section will be devoted to the (re)construction of a suitable frame for such
tasks.
2 The Formal Framework
To attempt a clearer formulation of simplicity, strength and balance we have to use a toolkit
of more precise, and possibly shared, definitions. According to Lewis, these notions are to be
applied to scientific theories conceived as deductive systems. But what is a deductive system
exactly? In his words a deductive system is a “deductively closed, axiomatizable sets of true
sentences”(Lewis, 1973, p. 73). However, a deductive system is usually understood as a purely
syntactic object.6 What is then the role of truth in a formal representation of scientific theories
and what do we mean by deductive system? Given that BSA is essentially a formal account
of lawhood, the notions of axiomatization, derivation and deductive system are crucial. But
Lewis is not explicit in explaining how they enter the picture. I maintain that we need a more
precise formal framework. This is not just a concern about tidiness: we need an improved
version of BSA to evaluate BSA itself, its assumptions and its consequences. Questions like
• what conception of scientific theories is required by BSA?
4Where ‘formulation’ refers to the formulation of a deductive system.
5See for examples, among the recent papers, (Bird, 2008, p. 74) and (Cohen and Callender, 2009, p. 4).
6See (Font, Jansana, and Pigozzi, 2003, p. 5 and subsection 2.2).
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• how do standards of simplicity and strength look like?
• how do we calculate the balance of a deductive system?
cannot be addressed employing the 1973 formulation of BSA. In what follows I will provide an
aswer to the first two questions and suggest possible replies to the third one.
To this end in the rest of this section we will attempt a reconstruction of BSA. Assuming
that scientific theories can be formalized, we treat them as theories in model-theoretic sense.7
To add further generality, we abstract from a particular deductive system (in Model Theory it
is usually first order classical logic) using a general theory of logical calculi such as the one
developed in Abstract Algebraic Logic.8 This latter step enables us to vary the inferential
environment in which a scientific theory lives and study the consequences.
2.1 Logical languages and formulas
Prior to outlining the definition of deductive system, let us define a formal language along
the lines of Johnstone’s presentation.9 For the sake of simplicity I will stick to first order
languages (for a definition of language appropriate for higher order logic see (Johnstone, 2002,
p. 940)). Each language can have non-logical symbols for basic sorts, functions and relations:
these symbols constitute the signature of the language. A signature Σ is thus composed of:
1. A set Σ-Sort of sorts, symbols for kinds or families of objects.
2. A set Σ-Fun of function symbols together with a map assigning to each function symbol
its type, a finite non empty list of sorts (where the last sort is the sort of the output). We
write f : A1 . . . An → B to indicate that f has type A1 . . . AnB and call n the arity of f . If
n = 0 f is called a constant of sort B.
3. A set Σ-Rel of relation symbols together with a map assigning to each relation symbols
its type, a list of sorts as in the previous case. We write R : A1 . . . An to indicate that R
has type A1 . . . An and call n the arity of R. If n = 0 R is called an atomic proposition.
For each sort A of Σ-Sort we assume to have a countably infinite number of variables of sort A.
We now define the terms of a language and their sorts recursively (we write t : A to indicate
that t is a term of sort A):
1. x : A if x is a variable of sort A.
2. f(t1, . . . , tn) : B if f : A1 . . . An → B and t1 : A1, . . . , tn : An.
Note that for the second clause constants are terms. The terms are those collections of symbols
of the language that stand for individuals (even though they do not always denote a specific
one).
The next step is to define the formulas of the language, but to do that we first have to
introduce the logical symbols. Roughly speaking10, logical symbols are defined by a set Con of
7The founding fathers of this approach are, among the others, Tarski and Carnap, see (Tarski, 1944,
pp. 346–347), (Tarski, 1994) and (Carnap, 1937). For more recent considerations on this stance see
(da Costa and French, 2000), for a classic text of Model Theory see (Chang and Keisler, 1990).
8See (Font, Jansana, and Pigozzi, 2003).
9See (Johnstone, 2002, p. 808).
10For the sake of brevity we avoid a precise discussion of free and bounded variables. This discussion
is inessential for our purposes and these notions should be clear to anyone familiar with basic logic. See
(Johnstone, 2002, p. 809) for details.
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quantifiers and connectives symbols together with a map assigning to each connective symbol
a natural number n corresponding to its arity. A language L is thus composed of a signature
Σ, a set Con with the relative map and a set of auxiliary symbols (such as brackets). With the
aid of logical symbols we can finally define the set of formulas FmL of the language L in the
usual recursive fashion:
1. R(t1, . . . , tn) belongs to FmL if R is a relation of type A1, . . . , An and t1 : A1, . . . , tn : An.
2. c(φ1, . . . , φn) belongs to FmL if c is an n-ary connective and φ1, . . . , φn are formulas.
3. qx.φ(x) belongs to FmL if q is a quantifier and φ(x) is a formula with free variable x.
The formulas obtained via the first condition are called atomic formulas. By definition they
are completely independent from the choice of connectives. The set FmL is thus generated
combining atomic formulas by means of connectives and quantifiers. In general, formulas are
assertions about individuals.
2.2 Deductive systems and theories
Now that we have all the linguistic notions in place, let us turn to the definition of deductive
system. Following (Font, Jansana, and Pigozzi, 2003), a deductive system or a logic in a
language L is a pair S = 〈FmL,`S〉 where `S is a substitution invariant consequence relation
on FmL, i.e., a relation `S⊆ ℘(FmL)× FmL satisfying:
1. if φ ∈ X then X `S φ.
2. if X `S φ for all φ ∈ Y and Y `S ψ then X `S ψ.
Intuitively `S represents all the inferential procedures of a deductive system. When such
relation holds between a set of formulas Γ and a formula φ we write Γ `S φ to mean that
we can derive the formula φ, the conclusion, applying the inferential procedures of `S to the
formulas in Γ, the premises. In general, a deductive system is nothing more than a machinery
to make proofs in a certain language, it is a purely syntactical inferential engine.
As this definition shows, a deductive system is dependent on the language, or, more
precisely, on the set of formulas generated by a certain language. But there is, as we have seen,
a distinction between logical and non-logical symbols, between the set Con and the signature
of a language. The reason for this distinction is that a deductive system is dependent on the
connectives and quantifiers but not on the signature. Logical symbols play an essential role in
inferential processes, while the non-logical symbols are idle in this respect.
The theorems of S are the formulas φ such that ∅ `S φ, that is, the formulas that can be
proved without any premise. There are different ways to present a deductive system: for
example as an axiomatic calculus, as a natural deduction calculus or as a sequent calculus.
Given that the issue of the number of axioms is important in Lewis’ definition of the criterion
of simplicity, let us spend a few words on the axiomatization of deductive systems (we will
return to the problem in Subsection 3.1.1). A Hilbert-style calculus is a pair P = 〈Ax,Ru〉
consisting of a set of axioms and a set of inference rules, where by ‘inference rule’we mean
any pair 〈Γ, φ〉 and by axiom a rule of the form 〈∅, φ〉 (which is usually written simply as φ). In
what follows we will use the term ‘inference rule’ to refer to inference rules stricto sensu, not
to axioms.
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A pair 〈Ax,Ru〉 is a presentation of a deductive system S if Γ `S φ iff φ is contained in the
smallest set of formulas that includes Γ together with all substitution instances of the axioms
of Ax, and is closed under direct derivability by the inference rules in Ru.
The same deductive system can have different presentations: given two presentations P1
and P2 in the same language, it is sufficient that the consequence relation `1 associated with
P1 is the same as the consequence relation `2 associated with P2. This for example happens
when, given the same inference rules and two different sets of axioms Ax1 and Ax2, we can
derive all the axioms of Ax1 from Ax2 and vice versa.
We define an S-theory (or just a theory, when S is understood) as a set of formulas Γ closed
under the consequence relation `S , i.e., such that if Γ `S φ then φ ∈ Γ. In words, Γ is closed
under the consequence relation if every formula that can be derived from the formulas in Γ is
already in Γ. The smallest S-theory will be of course the set of theorems of S, and, as can be
easily seen, the set of theorems of S is included in every S-theory. In what follows we will use
the symbols T1, T2, etc to refer to theories, in order to distinguish them from ordinary sets of
formulas.
A S-theory T is generated by a set of formulas Θ if, for all φ, φ ∈ T iff Θ `S φ, that is to
say, if we can derive any formula of T from Θ and no formula that can be derived from Θ is
outside T. Given any presentation P = 〈Ax,Ru〉 of S, the set of theorems of S is generated
by (the substitution instances of) the statements in Ax. Given our previous characterization
of the presentation of a deductive system, we will use the term ‘axiom’ only to indicate the
statements used in a Hilbert-style presentation, and we will employ the term ‘hypothesis’ to
denote the statements used to generate an S-theory different from the trivial one composed
only of theorems. We can have different sets of hypotheses for the same S-theory, and these
sets can be partially overlapping or completely disjoint. We will use the term ‘presentation of
theory T’ to refer to a set of hypotheses ΘT used to generate T.
2.3 Old and new
How do these concepts relate to Lewis’? What we called deductive system has no counterpart
in Lewis’ account, probably because of the fact that he was considering only one logic, classical
logic, and thus he had no need to introduce further distinctions. What Lewis terms ‘deductive
system’ is, in our framework, an S-theory. An S-theory is then what corresponds to a scientific
theory. By definition, an S-theory T is deductively closed, every formulas that can be deduced
from those in T is already contained in T.
Furthermore, an S-theory is axiomatizable in the sense that it can be generated by a set
of hypotheses Θ. We have thus recovered most of Lewis’ original idea of a deductive systems
as “deductively closed, axiomatizable sets of true sentences”. Is there a sense in which an
S-theory is a set of true sentences?
The answer to this question is: no, unless we take some semantic considerations into
account. These would add another layer to our framework. For the rest of this article we
will remain at the level of the syntax, running the risk of oversimplification, and leave the
semantic side to be developed in future work.
Let us summarize what we have defined in this section. In the framework here presented
a scientific theory is composed of the following ingredients:
1. a language L, composed of a signature Σ, a set Con of connectives with the relative maps
and some auxiliary symbols.
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2. a deductive system S, defined by a consequence relation on the set of formulas generated
by L.
3. a set of hypothesis Θ.
A concrete example of a scientific theory presented in a similar fashion can be found in
“Axiomatic Foundations of Classical Particle Mechanics” by McKinsey, Sugar and Suppes
(McKinsey, Sugar, and Suppes, 1953).
2.4 The mathematical apparatus of scientific theories
I have so far ignored the mathematical apparatus employed by many scientific theories. How
does mathematics fit into the picture just described? The answer is: we treat mathematical
theories as theories in a model-theoretic sense and we add them to the other hypotheses.
Therefore, if a scientific theory T is using a particular piece of mathematics, an axiomatization
of the mathematical notions employed in T will be included in the set of hypotheses ΘT . If, for
example, a scientific theory uses real numbers to represent some parameters, we will insert in
the mathematical hypotheses an axiomatization of the arithmetic of real numbers.11
In this respect it is worth noting that to be able to axiomatize certain mathematical theories
we may require a language rich enough to formulate the axioms (‘mathematical hypotheses’
in our terminology) and a deductive system powerful enough to deduce the desired theorems
(some mathematical theories may require second order logic, for example).12 As a consequence,
because of the mathematics they employ, some scientific theories cannot even be formulated
without assuming a core vocabulary and some kind of minimal deductive power.
The advantage of this account of mathematics is an extreme flexibility: we can tailor the
mathematical notions to the need of a scientific theory and study what happens when we
modify such notions or their axiomatization (see Subsections 3.1.1 and 3.2 for the implications
for simplicity and strength). Moreover, without any specific commitment to the content of
the mathematical and non-mathematical hypotheses, we can reasonably hope to describe
both the highly-formalized scientific theories, where mathematics is pervasive and there are
few non-mathematical hypotheses, and the non-formal scientific theories, where very few
mathematical assumptions will be coupled with many non-mathematical hypotheses. Another
point worth making is that in this account there is no syntactic characteristic to distinguish
between mathematical and non-mathematical hypotheses, in the sense that both are treated
as formal statements (maybe the former are more heavily formalized than the latter).
3 Redefining the Core Notions
Having defined a scientific theory as an S-theory, I now turn to the discussion of simplicity
and strength. Before analyzing how a theory can be simpler or stronger than another one,
however, there is an important observation to make. The comparison between two theories is
meaningful, I believe, only if these theories are about overlapping domains of events. To explain
this with an example, if I am interested in the laws of nature governing the electromagnetic
phenomena I will consider theories that model this kind of phenomena, not Population Biology.
This means that at least a naive idea of the intended semantics of our theories is needed if we
want to avoid useless comparisons between unrelated theories.
11As, for example, the one in (Tarski, 1994, p. 205).
12For a thorough discussion of this matter see (Parsons, 2010).
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With this in mind and the aid of the framework just defined, let us now turn to simplicity,
strength and balance, in this order. In what follows I will intend all the relations in their weak
version, that is, we will use the terms ‘subset’ as short for ‘subset or equal’, ‘less’ for ‘less or
equal in number’, and so on.
3.1 Simplicity
We start analyzing simplicity by having a closer look at Lewis’ formulation.
3.1.1 Conceptual Simplicity
In the Lewisian model a theory T1 is simpler than a theory T2 if T1 has fewer ‘axioms’ than T2.
In light of the previous discussion, I maintain that this statement is too vague. Translating
this definition into the new terminology one obtains two definitions:
1. T1 is simpler than T2 if T1 has fewer axioms than T2.
2. T1 is simpler than T2 if T1 has fewer hypotheses than T2.
depending on how one interprets Lewis’ term ‘axiom’. There are two observations to make.
The first one is that 1 is arguably in contrast with other notions of simplicity. Consider two
S-theories T1 and T2 with the same language, the same deductive system and the same
hypotheses. The difference between T1 and T2 lies in the presentation of the deductive system
S: the presentation in T1 has, say, 3 axioms and 2 inference rules; the presentation in T2 has
10 axioms and 2 inference rules. As can be easily inferred, the derivations of theorems in
T1 will be generally longer than the derivations in T2, for the derivations in T1 will require
multiple uses of the same axioms to obtain lemmas that can be easily derived in T2. If T1 has
fewer axioms then derivations in T1 are more complicated from a computational point of view
(see Subsection 3.1.3). The second observation concerns the second definition of simplicity,
conceptual simplicity from now on. We can have two versions of conceptual simplicity, a ceteris
paribus one and a general one:
Definition 1 (Ceteris paribus conceptual simplicity (CPCS)). For every pair of theories T1
and T2 sharing the same language L and the same deductive system S, we define:
T1 is simplerCPCS than T2 if T1 has fewer hypotheses than T2.
Definition 2 (General conceptual simplicity (GCS)). For every pair of theories T1 and T2:
T1 is simplerGCS than T2 if T1 has fewer hypotheses than T2.
As can be easily seen, CPCS is just GCS restricted to theories sharing the same language
and deductive system. In its domain of applicability CPCS is an effective measure of simplicity,
but such domain is extremely narrow and CPCS cannot be regarded as more than a limiting
case. GCS, on the other hand, is defined on every pair of theories, and it is probably the closest
to (our interpretation of) Lewis’ relation of simplicity. Notably, ‘having fewer hypotheses’ does
not mean that the first set of hypotheses is included in the other as a subset. Substituting the
condition of set-theoretical inclusion to the condition on the number of hypotheses one obtains
two different relations: CPCS* and GCS*. By the definition of S-theory, CPCS* is nothing
more than the relation of inclusion between different set of hypotheses generating the same
theory (that is, it is applicable only if T1 and T2 coincide). An interesting version of GCS* is:
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Definition 3 (Mathematical Simplicity (MS)). For every two theories T1 and T2:
T1 is simplerMS than T2 if MH(T1)) is a subset of MH(T1).
where MH(T1)) and MH(T2)) denote the set of mathematical hypotheses of T1 and T2
respectively.
The reason why a small number of hypotheses is preferable is quite clear: a compact theory
is easier to handle and to understand.
Nevertheless, somebody may wonder why the number of hypotheses should be an indicator
of simplicity in the first place. The obvious objection is: given a language with conjunction,
it is possible to conflate finitely many formulas into one by taking the conjunction of them
(even infinitely many, if the language has infinitary conjunctions). This of course makes the
counting of hypotheses an irrelevant matter. This however is not a problem, for two reasons.
The first, of a pragmatic flavour, is simply that there are no theories with hypotheses where
the conjunction is the main connective. The second is that, even if we want to avoid pragmatic
considerations, it is possible to write a simple computer programs that, in counting the number
of hypotheses, checks whether the hypotheses have a conjunction as outer connective. If this
is the case, the program consider the subformulas as distinct hypotheses, and restarts the
counting (and the check). As long as we have hypotheses made of finitely many symbols, the
program will output the correct number of axioms, despite of conjunctions.
Nevertheless, the number of hypotheses is just one of the components of a theory, and we
should also consider the role of languages and deductive systems.
3.1.2 Expressive simplicity
As far as the language is concerned, we can compare two theories in terms of the expressive
power of their signatures, of their expressive simplicity. Let us explain this with an example.
Consider two theories T1 and T2 such that in both their signatures there is a sort A. In the
language of T1 there is a symbol for a constant of sort A, while in the language of T2 there
is no such symbol, and thus to refer to the same object we have to use a paraphrase like
“the object of sort A satisfying conditions x, y, etc”. The same argument can be applied to
every other symbol of the signature: to function symbols (“the function of type A . . . satisfying
conditions x, y, etc”) and to relation symbols (“the relation of type A . . . satisfying conditions x,
y, etc”).
The signature of T2 is simpler in the sense that it has less symbols and that some symbols
of T1 can be substituted by a combination of symbols of T2. This feature can be important if
we want to minimize the number of primitives for foundational purposes. The signature of
T1 is simpler in the sense that is less cumbersome, instead of repeating a long list of symbols
we can just employ a shorter expression. This can make the difference, for example, from a
didactic perspective or for computational complexity. We have here two conflicting notions of
simplicity.
Definition 4 (Expressive Simplicity with Less Symbols (ESLS)). For every two theories T1
and T2:
T1 is simplerESLS than T2 if T1 has less symbols than T2
Definition 5 (Expressive Simplicity with More Symbols (ESMS)). For every two theories T1
and T2:
T1 is simplerESMS than T2 if T1 has more symbols than T2
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Explicitating a particular kind of symbols in these definitions, respectively sort, function and
relation symbols, we have three more specific versions of ESLS and ESMS. Along these lines,
the importance of ESLS and ESMS can be weighed relatively to the symbols under examina-
tion: we may want a symbol with a pivotal role in our theory, say, the constant representing
the speed of light, to be included in the signature, while a conceptually subordinate symbol
may be defined in terms of others.
3.1.3 Computational Simplicity
It is also possible to find notions of simplicity connected with the deductive system of a theory.
Consider for example the following case. Given a set of formulas Γ regarded as true, say, a set
of formulas representing empirical observations or some important theorems, a theory T1 may
be judged simpler than a theory T2 if the derivations of the formulas in Γ in T1 are ‘simpler’
than the corresponding derivations in T2.
But how can a derivation be simpler than another one? Before examining possible candi-
dates of computational simplicity, one has to qualify two points. First, there are two variables
to consider: which deductive system is used and how it is presented. A ‘stronger’ deductive
system, one which is an extension of another one, for example, may produce simpler proofs
(see below for examples of what this can mean). A more compact presentation, one employing
fewer axioms or inference rules, will usually determine more complex derivations. Second, as
far as computational simplicity is concerned, the choice of connectives has to be considered as
part of the presentation of a deductive system. A wide set of connectives without the relative
axioms or inference rules (say, having the symbol of conjunction but only axioms and inference
rules for the symbol of entailment) cannot enhance the simplicity of derivations and, vice
versa, axioms and inference rules can be used only in the presence of the relative connective
symbol. This is why the choice of connective symbol is relevant for computational simplicity
and not only for expressive simplicity. Here are two proposals for computational simplicity:
Definition 6 (Computational Simplicity in Length (CSL)). For every two theories T1 and T2
and for every set of formulas Γ:
T1 is simplerΓCSL than T2 if all the derivations of the formulas in Γ in T1 are shorter than
those in T2
To be able to compare the lengths of proofs we have to introduce a measure of such length
(usually the number of lines).
Definition 7 (Computational Simplicity in Time (CST)). For every two theories T1 and T2, for
every set of formulas Γ and given a suitable automated theorem prover (a computer program
that produces derivations), we define:
T1 is simplerΓCST than T2 if all the derivations of the formulas in Γ from the hypotheses in T1
take less time than those in T2
Depending on the prover employed, this may require that T1 and T2 share the same deductive
system. As long as Γ consists of a single formula, we can apply CSL and CST without worries.
But if Γ contains two or more formulas one could have problems of applicability. Consider a
case where T1 is simplerΓ∗CSL than T2 and T2 is simpler
Γ+
CSL than T1, where Γ∗ and Γ+ are
two disjoint subsets of Γ. In this case CSL cannot be applied relatively to Γ (an analogous
argument can be made for CST). To overcome this impasse and define a universally applicable
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version of CSL (CST respectively) we may define a total measure of length (respectively time)
for the derivations of the formulas in Γ and then compare the total measure in T1 with the
total measure in T2 instead of comparing derivations pairwise. This approach leads to a
generalized version of CSL (respectively CST).
It remains to say why these notions of simplicity are interesting candidates. A common
agument can be made for CSL and CST. It is essentially an optimization argument: given any
application of a theory (for example checking whether some formulas follow from the theory or
not) we prefer the theory that requires less effort to be used. Indeed, the fact that a theory is
computationally expensive can be a reason to change or improve the theory.
3.2 Strength
For Lewis a theory is stronger than another if it has more informational content (Lewis, 1999,
p. 41). If we interpret the informational content of a theory T as all the formulas that can
be derived from the hypotheses of T we have that, by definition of S-theory as a deductively
closed set of formulas, the informational content of T coincides with T. If one sticks to this
interpretation it is possible to formulate strength as:
Definition 8 (General Strength (GS)). For every two theories T1 and T2:
T1 is strongerGS than T2 if T2 is a subset of T1
GS is interesting because it encodes the fact that we can reduce one theory to another, that
is, we can prove all the statements of the first one inside the second one. There are cases,
however, where GS cannot be applied. A sets of formulas can be included in another only if
they share the same language, or the language of the bigger set is an extension of the other
one. Another approach could be the following. Given a set of true formulas Γ, say, the formulas
representing the observations made, the informational content of theory T is the portion of Γ
that is derivable from the hypotheses of T, that is, the intersection between Γ and T. Of course
the formulas in Γ have to refer to the shared part of the intended domain of interpretation,
otherwise one of the two theories will be weaker a priori. We then have:
Definition 9 (Informational Strength (IS)). For every two theories T1 and T2, and given a
set of formulas Γ:
T1 is strongerΓIS than T2 if the informational content of T1 relative to Γ is bigger than that of
T2
where by bigger I mean cardinality-wise. One can of course restrict this notion substituting ‘is
bigger than’ in the definition with ‘includes’ obtaining IS*. Obviously, IS* entails IS for every
Γ.
We could also relate the notion of strength to that of deductive system:
Definition 10 (Computational Strength (CS)). For every two theories T1 and T2:
T1 is strongerCS than T2 if `T2 is a subset of `T1
In other words, the deductive system of T1 is strongerCS than that of T2 if in T1 we can derive
every formula derivable in T2 and some more. Notably, if T1 and T2 share the same set of
hypotheses then CS implies GS and IS* for every Γ. CS holds even though T1 and T2 do not
share the language, as the language of, say, T1 can be an extension of that of T2.
Along the same lines of CS one can introduce a notion of strength connected with the
mathematical apparatus of theories. A first option can be the inverse relation of MS:
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Definition 11 (Mathematical Strength (MSt)). For every two theories T1 and T2:
T1 is strongerMSt than T2 if MH(T2) is a subset of MH(T1)
We have here a straightforward example of the conflict between a relation of strength and
a relation of simplicity: if T1 is simplerMS than T2 then T2 is strongerMSt than T1. However,
this is not the case in general for the notions that we defined, for example Expressive Simplicity
is independent from Mathematical Strength. Hence the trade-off between simplicity and
strength mentioned by Lewis is a consequence of particular selections of notions of simplicity
and strength.
Alternatively, one can impose a further condition to have a more informative relation:
Definition 12 (Strict Mathematical Strength (SMS)). For every two theories T1 and T2:
T1 is strongerSMS than T2 if MH(T2) is a proper subset of MH(T1)
This last relation might be appealing if we think that a particular mathematical theory is
essential to model a certain class of phenomena, say, Hilbert spaces to model Quantum phe-
nomena, and we want to draw a distinction between theories that employ such mathematical
machinery and theories that do not.
3.3 Balance
Depending on the notions of simplicity and strength adopted, we can define balance in many
ways. Following the characterization of simplicity and strength as binary relations, I will treat
balance as a binary relation as well, that is to say, I will consider relative balance. In the
presence of some absolute measures of simplicity and strength, absent in the present work,
one may attempt a definition of the absolute balance of a theory.
As can be easily checked, apart from SMS all the relations defined are preorders in their
respective domain of applicability, that is, they are reflexive and transitive. With this in mind,
let us sketch two general procedures to define the balance. Suppose we have a set of theories
to evaluate and a collection of relations of simplicity and strength.
The first procedure, of a qualitative nature, consists of aggregating the orderings of the
set of theories produced by the chosen relations. Formally, this means that given n orderings
R1, . . . , Rn we want to have a procedure to obtain a single ordering R. The top theory/theories
according to this last relation will be the best system(s). Of course, depending on how we
aggregate these orderings we will obtain different outcomes. One first question to pose in this
respect is: are all orderings equally relevant or do we regard some criteria as privileged?
A mathematical environment where such an aggregation procedure can be studied is
provided by Social Choice.13 To make an example, in this framework the condition encoding
the idea that all orderings must be equally relevant is called anonimity (invariance of the
aggregator under the permutations of the input orderings). In this context, given two theories
T1 and T2 and k relations corresponding to the equally relevant selection criteria, we may say
that T1 is better than T2 if T1 is preferable according to k/2 + 1 relations. The extent to which
results and techniques of Social Choice can be applied to the present case will be explored in
future work.
The second procedure involves the definition of quantitative measures relative to the chosen
relations. If, say, T1 is simplerGCS than T2 we could take the difference between the number
13For a standard reference in the field see (Gaertner, 2009).
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of hypotheses in T2 and the number of hypotheses in T1 as a number representing how much
simpler T1 is compared to T2. By similar methods, counting or using percentages, one may
associate a function to each relation in order to evaluate the relative degree of simplicity or
strength. If this attempt succeeds one can then use these functions to construct an algorithm
able to analyze the set of theories, apply such functions and combine the results to find the
theories that score the best combination according to the chosen relations of simplicity and
strength. To continue the example above, we could assign weights n1, . . . , nk to the k relations
and say that the score of T1 is the sum of the weights of the relations in which T1 is preferable
over T2. We could then conclude that T1 is better than T2 if T1 has a higher score.
Before concluding, we make three final remarks. The first is that the choice of the collection
of relations of simplicity and strength does not influence the balance function just by changing
the arity of its input. In the second methodology a particular choice of relations might change
the internal structure of the algorithm. For example, if we employ General Strength we might
want the algorithm to check this relation first, to know whether one theory is reducible to
the other. The second remark is that in both cases if the chosen relations cannot be applied
to the set of theories, because theories do not share enough features for the relations to be
applied, we could not find any best system. The third remark concerns the viability of the two
methodologies. Both of them are applicable only if the chosen relations are decidable. If they
are not, then in the first case we might not get the orderings at all, and in the second case the
algorithm may not terminate.
3.4 Conclusion
Let us draw some conclusions. In light of the formal analysis outlined and of the examples
offered, I argue that the aforementioned framework is appropriate for a precise characteriza-
tion of the notions of simplicity, strength and balance. Moreover, I believe that the plurality
of definable notions of simplicity (respectively, strength and balance) casts doubt on Lewis’
reliance on a single concept and demands for a more comprehensive discussion. Simplicity,
strength and balance are, I think, multifaceted ideas, and the search for a unique characteri-
zation could be misleading. This of course does not imply that such notions have to be vague,
as the present work showed.
Indeed we have alternative versions of BSA depending on
1. which relations of simplicity and strength we use
2. how do we aggregate them to obtain the balance
It is already hard to reach a consensus on the first item. For an experimental physicist,
interested in testability and implementations, theories may be compared with an eye for their
computational features. A philosopher, on the other hand, could think that the best theory is
one with few primitives.
The advantage of our framework, as long as it is considered tenable, is that now we can
look at specific, well defined candidates for relations of simplicity and strength. Likewise,
we can design and analyze procedures to obtain the balance. This means that the discussion
about item 1 and 2, although still philosophical in nature, is now more formally grounded.
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